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Abstract 
Recent studies in the innovation literature reveal that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
promotes the innovation activities in the recipent country through spillover effects. In 
this paper we extend the existing literature by incooprating the corruption index in the 
estimation procedure. Using a cross-country analysis from the Europe and Central 
Asia (ECA) region , covering 57 countries over the period of 1995-2010, we find no 
evidence of FDI spillover effect on innovative activity, when corporate corruption is 
endogenously modelled in the regression. However, corporate corruption and 
expenditure on education sector are positively related to the number of patents 
applications, suggesting anti-corruption programs encourage real innovation activities 
that promotes economic growth. Our study shed light on the national innovation 
activities and anti-corruption programs. 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment; Corruption; Innovation; Technology transfer 
JEL classification:  O32, O34, O38, F21, D73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The global economy has yet to shake off the fallout from the crisis of 2008-2009. 
Based on estimation of the International Monetary Fund, the gross domestic product 
of eurozone economy will face 0.1% decline in 2013. A long-term policy is needed to 
promote sustainable economic growth. Innovation has been widely recognized as a 
key drive of economic growth and identifying the determinants of innovation is a 
crucial first step for designing effective policies to enhance economic development 
and growth. However, despite several studies on this topic (for instance, (Anokhin & 
Schulze, 2009)), there is still limited empirical evidence about how countries can 
promote their innovative capacity,  especially in emerging countries where political 
corruption and corporate corruption prevails. 
Corruption is a major obstacle for economic development for developing countries. 
Corruption impedes FDI, increases transaction cost and limits entrepreneur’s market  
(Anokhin & Schulze, 2009). More importantly, corruption delay the permission of 
licenses and reduce trust of entrepreneur on institution, therefore it impedes the 
process of innovation. However, some research also shows that corruption can grease 
the wheel of economic development by speeding the bureaucratic process and 
jumping policy hurdle (Chen, Liu, & Su, 2013; Wang & You, 2012). With limited and 
mixed empirical evidence on the influence of corruption on innovation, therefore we 
need to empirically study what is the impact of corruption on innovation. 
The aim of this research is to make a modest contribution towards filling those 
gaps in existing literature. Our results indicate that research and development 
expenditures and education expense play a critical role in promoting innovative 
activity. However, FDI does not have any influence on innovation, and surprisingly, 
corruption indeed grease the wheel of economic growth and promote innovative 
capabilities of countries in ECA region. 
Obviously, a single empirical research cannot come up with firm conclusions 
about what factors influence innovative activity among all countries. However, it can 
shed some new light on national economic policy issues that are also being 
investigated in other studies on the subject. Our research will help countries in ECA 
regions to develop powerful policy to promote regional economic growth, such as 
focusing on education and R&D. Another contribution of the paper is to reveal the 
effect of corruption on innovative ability. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework of the research. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 
describes and discusses the empirical results, and section 5 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
It has been well established in the literature that innovation promote economic 
growth, and an increasing number of researchers start to investigate what factors 
determine the innovative ability of a country in the last few years. One stream of 
literature focuses on the importance of inputs in the production of knowledge, such as 
research and development expense, and number of scientists (Acs, Anselin, & Varga, 
2002; Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002). Research and development expenditure by 
government shows strong positive influence on the number of patents both in 
developed countries (Furman & Hayes, 2004) and also developing countries (Hu & 
Mathews, 2005). Continuous investment on R&D is essential for developing 
innovative ability of a country. South Korea’s real R&D expenditures in 1999 was 450 
more than that in 1978 and at the same time, South Korea demonstrated a dramatic 
increase in nation’s overall innovation capacity (Furman & Hayes, 2004). Countries 
with strong commitment on innovation and significant investment on R&D can 
achieve relatively higher level of innovative capacity. In a general equilibrium model, 
Fung and Lau (2013) shows that investment price will is a negative function of 
aggregate quality index; and thus decline over time and subsidy on R&D has 
growth-enhancing effect.  
A narrow focus on the role of science and science related activities cannot fully 
develop institution’s innovation capacity as new knowledge cannot be produced in 
vacuum, institutional factors, stated by national innovation system theory, are another 
strong determinants for innovation ability (Edquist, 1997)1. National innovation 
system was mainly developed in 1980s and received more attention in 1990s 
(Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen, & Dalum, 2002). It is used as a framework to analyze 
science and technology policy in a number of western countries. It helps to understand 
factors behind international competitiveness and economic development. Initially, the 
concept of national innovation system was developed mainly in the western countries, 
e.g. US, UK and now it starts to expand to developing countries but the research in 
emerging economy is still limited. For developing countries, the institutions play a 
more important role in economic development compared to developed countries. As 
in mature market economies, the market solves most problems, so institutional factors 
have small influence in economic development. Social and economic institutions have 
shown to demonstrate the variance of innovation ability among countries. For 
example, differences in economic development (Grande & Peschke, 1999), patent 
                                                      
1 The authors did not explicitly explain institutional factors in details, and we argue in this paper that 
corporate corruption is one important institutional factor, which is our main contribution to the existing 
literature of innovation activities.  
rights protection (Varsakelis, 2001), and quality of education (Varsakelis, 2006) 
influences nation’s innovative ability. 
 
FDI has been well recognized as an important factor in national innovation system 
to promote innovative activities through spill-over effect (Baskaran, 2008). Foreign 
firms transfer technology to subsidiaries and local firms in host country benefit FDI 
from a number of ways (Cheung & Lin, 2004). First of all, local firms can imitate the 
designs of the new developed product of foreign companies by reverse engineering, 
and build up new innovative product. Secondly, employment and training supplied by 
foreign firms can enhance the quality of human resource, and those skilled labors will 
move to other factories in host countries, and therefore knowledge is transferred to 
other domestic companies. Thirdly, FDI can produce “demonstration effect”. The 
foreign products in market can stimulate domestic competitor’s innovation to generate 
ideas for innovative product. Lastly, FDI can promote technological know-how 
transfer vertically from foreign investing firms to local suppliers through knowledge 
exchange and training. Then local suppliers can develop innovative products based on 
vertically spillover knowledge. Besides advantages mentioned above, FDI also creates 
more jobs and supplies higher wages to workers, therefore many countries develop 
policy to encourage FDI, however, the effect of FDI on innovation is not conclusive. 
The wide techonology gap between developed and developing coutries make the 
spillover effect subtle (Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999) 
Besides FDI, trade is also an important factor which influence innovative 
activities. Trade facilitates the flow of professional knowledge and diffusion of 
tecnology (Grossman & Helpman, 1991). It expends the networks of communication 
of technical knowledge and fosters the colloboration among international partners and 
reduces duplication of research. Besides, trade can enhance compeititions of both 
domestic and international market which lead to better product and service, and 
expand the market size of exporting firms. However, trade also has been shown to 
increase competition faced by local firm which produce similar products. The effect 
of positive externatlity from trade could outweitht the competition domestic firms 
face. Because of fierece compeition from foreign firms, domestic firms may adopt 
cost minimizing approach, rathen than spending money on innovation, especially for 
emerging economy, where majorty of firms focus on labor intensive type of job and 
does not have incentive to develop innovative product. Therefore, trade may decrease 
the level of innovative activities. Cheung and Lin (2004) stresses that firms with 
larger export–output shares cannot signigicantly benefit from intrnational trade 
because the foreign firms coming to China only want to utilize China’s cheap labor, 
and hence the technologies they bring in are mostly labor intensive and the spillover 
effects on domestic innovation is not strong. In the paper of Cheung and Lin (2004) 
they use a standard model that implicitly assumes Chinese economy as a formal 
economy with free market economy. Therefore in their empirical modeling strategy 
they ignore the most crucial informal institutional feature of corporate corruption. And 
this ignorance makes the estimates of FDI invalid because of omitted variable 
problem (i.e. corporate corruption was omitted).  Apart from FDI some other 
channels can also transfer technology and skills from one country to another: in the 
study of Bilgin, Lau and Demir (2012) 
 
The outcome of innovation activities is difficult to measure, however the number 
of patent is a good proxy to reflect innovation activities in each countries(Acs et al., 
2002). The number of patents application has increased continuously in the last 
decades, which demonstrates the importance of patents in knowledge based economy. 
Patent is a good method to track the knowledge among firms, universities and 
countries. In this paper, we focus on the definition on the OECD manual (OECD, 
2005), and broadly innovations can be categorized into four different types: Product 
Innovations: Introduction of a good or service that is new or significantly improved 
with respect to its characteristics and intended uses. Process Innovations: 
Implementation of a new or significantly improved production or delivery method. 
This includes significant changes in techniques, equipment and/or software. The 
process innovations can be intended to decrease unit costs of production or delivery. 
Marketing Innovations: Implementation of a new marketing method involving 
significant changes in product placement, promotion etc. Examples of marketing 
innovations include introduction or obtaining new product licensing. Organizational 
Innovations: Implementation of new organizational method in firm’s business 
practices, workplace organization and external relations. 
Another important factor which influences innovative activities is the efficiency of 
political institutions (Varsakelis, 2006). In national innovation system, dynamic 
networks of policies and institutions influence knowledge transfer among different 
countries and also within each country’s domestic industries. In order to absorb 
knowledge from foreign countries, an institution needs to implement policies that 
facilitate domestic firms to use and diffuse these technologies within domestic 
industry. Previous research has shown that the intellectual property protection 
framework influences a country’s innovation ability (Varsakelis, 2001). A country’s 
ability to enact a law bases on the quality of institutional agencies such as political 
stability and judiciary system. Efficient judiciary system can provide better protection 
on patents and therefore, entrepreneurs have higher incentive to innovate. However, 
countries with high corruption and low enforcement of law will affect diffusion of 
knowledge and impede innovation. Research shows that corruption and abuse of 
public power undermines the foundations of institutional trust and consequently 
hinder the innovative ability of entrepreneurs (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009). In the 
literature, corruption has been widely used as a proxy for the efficiency of political 
institutions (Mauro, 1995; Varsakelis, 2006). 
 
Despite the fact that a growing number of studies demonstrate importance of 
national innovation system in developed countries, limited research has been 
conducted to investigate national innovation system approach specific to developing 
countries. US, UK and Scandinavia countries are among the first to investigate 
national innovation system in order to understand factors behind economic 
development and growth. Focus has started to move to developing countries which 
show strong economic growth, like Asian countries. Also developing countries need 
effective policy guidelines to promote domestic innovative activities. Therefore in this 
study, we choose European and Central Asia (ECA) regions to study country specific 
effect of national innovation system. One reason for choosing ECA region is the fact 
that spatial proximity is an important force which facilitate flow of information and 
knowledge, as documented in the literature on innovative activity (de Dominicis, 
Florax, & de Groot, 2012; Jaffe, 1989). It has been well accepted that geographic 
proximity aid learning processes through mechanisms of knowledge spillovers, 
especially sticky knowledge. Tacit knowledge is un-codified and can only be acquired 
through the process of social interaction. The chance that tacit knowledge is 
transferred from one region to another region decreased when the geographic distance 
increase. Therefore, the closer a country to other innovative countries, the more 
chance of knowledge transfer between two countries and the more likely recipient 
countries exhibit a high capacity to introduce new products or processes. 
One of major obstacles currently faced by ECA countries is corruption, which is 
common among emerging countries. Substantial research has demonstrated 
detrimental effect of corruption on economic development. It is well recognized that 
corruption increases agency costs, limits firm’s revenues, undermine institutional trust 
(Anokhin & Schulze, 2009; Mauro, 1995). However, due to the complex relationships 
and associated data limitations for conducting studies2, the direct impact of corruption 
on innovative activity is still not clear based on current empirical studies. Especially, 
                                                      
2 Only few studies have been related to this issue, and these provide mixed evidence. For example, 
Anokhin et al. (2008) find that countries with higher control of corruption (derived from World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators) are associated with higher number of patents application. 
Mahagaonkar (2008) find that corruption has a positive effect on marketing innovation and negative 
effect on product innovation and organization innovation. 
entrepreneurs in developing countries often encounter corruption problems, and 
resource was allocated based on the relationship with government, usually through 
bribing. Therefore, it is even more important to investigate whether and to what extent 
corruption adversely affect the innovation activity in emerging countries. To date, this 
research topic has rarely been tested in empirical studies, and our study will fill some 
gaps in the current literature. 
High-tech firms play a crucial role in the transformation process from a 
developing economy to a developed economy. However, corruption undermines the 
foundations of institutional trust that are needed for the development of trade and 
innovative activity (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009; Varsakelis, 2006). Corruption taxs on 
trade and impedes trade between deveoloped and developing countries (Dutt & Traca, 
2010). FDI investors has higher chance to terminate contract with local partners of 
international joint venture in face of government corruption in emerging economy 
(Meschi, 2009). When corruption is present, FDI investors are reluctant to transfer 
advanced technology to corrupted countries as they face greatly increased risk. And in 
the absence of impersonal enforcement of law, it becomes risky to rely on legal 
contracts. Hellman found that corrupt nations tend to attract FDI from other corrupt 
nations, and less corrupt nations tend to attract FDI from less corrupt nations, where 
institutional trust is stronger and company face smaller risk of technology stolen 
(Hellman and Kaufmann, 2004). Similar empirical result shows that corrupted 
countries received less FDI from OECD countries and received more FDI from other 
corrupted countries. It suggests that investors who have experience in bribery at home 
are more willing to invest in countries with corruption practice (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006). Companies from less corrupt countries tend to enter using direct entry model in 
less corrupt countries rather than joint venture, which is commonly used in corrupt 
economies (Smarzynska & Wei, 2000). Therefore, corrupt nations are less likely to 
receive investment from high-tech companies that employ sophisticated technologies. 
Because ECA countries’ judiciary system is not transparent, e.g. Georgia before 2003 
reform (worldbank 2013), foreign investors are reluctant to transfer advanced 
knowledge to this region, which may cause low quality innovation and therefore slow 
economic growth. 
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is calculated by Transparency 
International and has been widely used as a measure for corruption (Varsakelis, 2006). 
CPI is based on survey of business people and industry expert over hundred countries. 
It measures those persons’ perception about the level of corruption in particular 
country. However, this subjective measure may not truly reflect the local situation. 
Instead of using perception, we adopt a real measurement which is collected by World 
Bank. We use firm’s informal payments to government as a measurement of 
corruption. This variable measures the percentage of firms that pay informal payments 
or gift to the public officials in a particular country. 
Previous studies on national innovation system have analyzed the impact of 
corruption and FDI on innovation in separate but parallel research paths. In this study, 
we explore how the corruption and FDI together affect the innovation activities in 
ECA countries. This approach distinguishes our study from all previous empirical 
research which only investigates on each factor. To our knowledge, this paper is the 
first one to investigate the impact of FDI and corruption on innovative activities in 
ECA regions.  
Education plays a critical role in developing innovative capability of a country. 
Furman et al. (2002) demonstrated difference in education resources can explain the 
cross-country variation of innovation ability also Varsakelis (2006) shows the quality 
of education can explain the cross-country variation of innovation productivity.  
Formal education can improve student’s ability to learn and move the society into a 
learning economy. The learning capacity of individuals, firms and countries are most 
important elements in a national innovation systems (Lundvall et al., 2002). Quick 
learner can adapt to the changes of environment and technology and create new 
innovative product based on the evolving knowledge. Rapid learner can quickly 
understand explicit knowledge which is codified, and more importantly, they can 
learn tacit knowledge from other professionals, organizations and institutions. 
Managers captured domain expertise through formal education and educated manger 
can make decision to sustain the development of company and promote innovative 
activities (Holcomb, Holmes Jr, & Connelly, 2009). Education of staffs in a company 
influences the absorptive ability of firms and further affects firm’s innovative 
performance (Lund Vinding, 2006). 
   
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 The Sample 
The World Bank collection of development indicators covers 256 countries, with 
seven regions over the world. Judged from the demographic distribution of the seven 
regions, we decided to focus on Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region because of its 
abundant data available that enable us to form a more balanced panel data, as 
compared to other regions. More importantly ECA region represent an interesting 
study on the positve spillover effect of FDI on product innovation (measured as the 
number of patents application in the home country) due to its local proximity to each 
other.3 
 
Table 1. 57 Countries included in the analysis (1995–2010)             
                       
Albania  Faeroe Islands  Latvia  Serbia 
Andorra  Finland  Liechtenstein  Slovak Republic 
Armenia  France  Lithuania  Slovenia 
Austria  Georgia  Luxembourg  Spain 
Azerbaijan  Germany  Macedonia, FYR  Sweden 
Belarus  Greece  Moldova  Switzerland 
Belgium  Greenland  Monaco  Tajikistan
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Hungary  Montenegro  Turkey 
Bulgaria  Iceland  Netherlands  Turkmenistan 
Channel Islands  Ireland  Norway  Ukraine 
Croatia  Isle of Man  Poland  United Kingdom
Cyprus  Italy  Portugal  Uzbekistan 
Czech Republic  Kazakhstan  Romania 
Denmark  Kosovo  Russian Federation 
Estonia    Kyrgyz Republic    San Marino       
 
Our study is based on data from ECA and European countries for the period of 
1995-2010. Number of patent application was used as a measure of innovative activity. 
ECA countries encountered series of transition process from late 1980s to early 1990s. 
Since then, inventive activity has shown a clear increasing trend and this generally 
positive trend has been maintained up to the most recent years for which data are 
available (Figure 2.1). Especially, Russian and Poland shows stronger increase in the 
number of patent application in this period of time.  
 
 
 
                                                      
3 The diverse yet highly interdependent economies of Europe and Central Asia are a natural experiment in seeing 
how the emerging economies can learn from the developed European countries.  In our sample, advanced 
European countries including: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Portugal, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of patent applications (1995-2010) 
 
Figure 2.1 shows a long-run perspective on ECA patenting by tracking all patent 
applied to State Patent Office (data from World Bank indicator). Selected ECA 
includes: Russia, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine. We can 
see from the figures that ECA countries did catches up with Germany, while the 
number of patents in the UK is decreasing over time. An interesting question that 
which emerging countries copy innovation from European countries is usually lacked 
in the literature. And the number of patents applications in the well developed 
European countries may impose positive externality on ECA countries. In order to 
answer an interesting question of which emerging countries receives positive external 
benefits from which group of EU countries we therefore conduct granger causality 
test. The variable of interest is the number of patent applications. Table 2 shows the 
empirical findings after examining all countries in our sample, detailed statistics are 
available upon request. The result shows that Hungary, Czech Republic, Ukraine, 
Slovenia, and Estonia all benefits from the innovation activities that led by Spain.  
Table 2 Granger Causality Test 
     
Spain Germany Belgium 
Hungary Ukraine Turkey 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
1995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010
German UK Selected ECA 
Czech Republic Rusia Czech Republic 
Ukraine Hungary 
Slovenia 
Estonia     
Note: Evidences are based on 5% significance level 
 
Figure 2 Maps of Granger Causality Test Results 
 
 
Table 3 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Ln (Patent)  5.60  1.82  0.69  10.27  
Ln (R&D Exp/GDP)  0.61  0.38  0.02  1.86  
Ln (Number of Researchers)  7.12  0.74  4.12  8.24  
Ln (Trade)  99.31  31.83  36.55  199.68  
Ln (Education Expenditure) 22.95  1.70  19.22  27.08  
Ln (FDI Inflow) 1.36  0.95  -1.77  3.95  
Corruption (% of firms) 36.54  18.92  3.70  77.42  
Source: World Bank Indicator  
  
Tables 3 above shows the variables we used for regression analysis to examine 
the determinants of the number of patents applications, one striking figure is that 36% 
of firms on average reports of having been committed bribery to government officials 
for getting things done. For some countries this number reaches 60-77 percent, which 
indicates that the very important feature of informal institution in emerging 
economies is corporate corruption. And this variable of corporate corruption once 
ignored in the empirical analysis, it will causes omitted variable biase. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
We now turn to the empirical parts; we focus on panel regression analysis to 
examine the detrminanats of product innovations. Following Cheung and Lin (2004) 
the innovation production function in its empirical form can be represented as: 
 
ittitititikti vvCorrupFDIXPatent   ,,,0,               (1) 
where  tiPatent ,   is  the number of patent application to quantify the innovation level 
for country i at timet; the larger the number of patent application, the higher the 
innovation level. tiX , is the matrix for the country’s inputs into the R&D activities.  
iv  is the fixed effect for province i, tv is the time dummy, and it is the idiosyncratic 
disturbance. The idiosyncratic disturbances are assumed to be uncorrelated across the 
countries. Innovation is a knowledge creation process, the more the inputs the hihger 
the chance of success. Therefore the measure of inputs to R&D activities ( tiX , ) 
includes:  
 
NUMBER OF R&D RESEARCHERS 
The variable measures the number of personnel (experts) in the R&D sector, it proxy 
the labour input to the R&D activity.  We expect positive association bewteen this 
control variable and the number of patents applications.  
 
R&D EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA GDP 
This variabe measures the R&D intensity, it proxy not only the quantity of resources 
deveotd into the R&D activities but also the quality of capital and human resources 
into R&D processes.  Following Cheung and Ping (2004) we use the amount of 
expenditures spend on R&D sectors to poxy the resources, such as technicians, 
equipments and scientists that used to create new knowledge. We again expect 
positive association between this variable and innovation.  
 
EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION 
Since general eduxation is the foundation of any innovation activities, therefore we 
use exenditures on education , which was genrally ignored in the literature to proxy 
the positive externality effect of genral education as a public goods. We expect postive 
relatiohsop between this variable and the inoovation outcome. 
 
OPENNESS 
Here we also include the variable “OPENESS” , defined as the summation of 
imports and exports, to test if domestic firms can benenfit in domestic innovation 
from participating in the ovrseas markt. Hoever we expect this effect is week and even 
negative. Cheung and Ping (2004) finds that FDI firms with larger export–output 
shares cannot signigicantly benefit from intrnational trade because the FDI firms 
come to China only to utilize its cheap labor, and hence the technologies they bring in 
are mostly labor intensive and the spillover effects on domestic innovation is not 
strong. In our study FDI firms’s export to GDP ratio is generally not avaible for ECA 
coutnries. Therefore we expect even a negative effect assocaited with innovation and 
openss becuase most of these emerging markets only perform labor intensive process 
and lack of incentive to do its own nnovation if their economy is too much relie on 
exporting labor-intensive peoducts. Moreover, trade can pose negative impact on 
innovation through competition4.  
Turning to FDI, as we discueed extensively spillover effects of FDI may have 
positive influence on the number of domestic patent application. However the 
uncertainty of this hypothsis come from two sources. First this assumed association 
all depends on the form of ownership structure of the enterprises.  Obviosuly,  
foreign joint ventures and cooperative businesses are able to gnerate positve spillover 
effect than exclusively foreign-owned enterprises for instance. More importantly 
corruption may trigger FDI and hence the effect of FDI on innovation may be biased 
when the vaiable of corruption is ommited. Therefore in our empirical regression 
model we include the variable of corporate corruption ( tiCorrup , ), which measures 
the percentage of firms that pay informal payment or gift to the public officials in a 
particular counry.  As we emphasized in the literature, there is lack of research on 
the association of corporate corruption and innovation activities, espcially for the 
emerging markets, where resource allocation is often shaped by political connection. 
As a result, it is important to know whether and to what extent corruption is adversely 
affect the innovation activity of in emerging countries. To date, the impacts of 
corruption on innovation have rarely been empirically tested. In this paper, we aim to 
                                                      
4  As noted by Onodera (2008), an increase in competition can have both positive and negative effects 
on innovation depending on levels of existing competition, nature of the industry, and existing levels of 
technology. 
fill some gaps in the existing literature by focusing on whether corruption can 
adversely affect the innovation ability of firms in ECA region. In contrast to emerging 
markets, anti-corruption programs and regulations are well-established in the 
developed countries alike Western Euoropen countries like Germeny and France. 
Unfortunately the corporate corruption data is not avaible for developed countries, 
otherwise it would be interesting to conduct a compartive study to compare the impact 
of corporate corruption for emerging and developed markets. 
4. Empirical Result 
    Several estimation methods are considered in this study.  Column 1, 3, and 5 of 
table 4 shows the baseline random effect estimation5 of determinants of innovation 
activities countries from ECA region.  Several empirical findings are apparent. 
Column 1 shows the baseline modeling of the determinants (control variables) of 
product innovation. In general we observe positive correlation between R&D 
personnel and innovation activities, even though only model 3 is statistically 
significant at 10% level, while the coefficient in model 1 is marginally significant. For 
all random effects models, the expenditure on R&D intensity has positive impact on 
product innovation, indicating that the success rate of innovation becomes higher 
when the country devotes larger amount of resources to the sector, and the results are 
expected and consistent with the existing literature. However, there is no guarantee of 
having more innovations even when more human capital, as measured by the number 
of researchers is working in the sector.  The estimate for public expenditure on 
education is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, supporting the 
hypothesis that the higher the investment of a society in general education, the more 
efficient the innovation sector will become, as positive externality exists.  The 
negative impact of openness on innovation activities is observed, and this finding 
implies that the negative effect on innovation raised from increase in competition 
outweighs it positive contribution to innovation activities. As suggested by Onodera 
(2008), the mixed effects of openness on innovation depending on levels of existing 
competition, nature of the industry, and existing levels of technology.  
 
Table 4: Determinants of Innovation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                                                      
5 We use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country level, such that the 
computed t-values have been taken into account of the within-country but between-year correlation. 
The Hausman specification test indicates that the random effect model should be used. Results are not 
shown here to save space.  
 RE SGMM RE SGMM RE SGMM 
Number of 
R&D 
Researchers 
0.466 -0.0707 0.460* -0.378 0.191 0.548 
  [1.64] [-0.14] [1.69] [-1.02] [0.59] [0.42] 
        
R&D 
EXPENDITURE 
0.422** 0.105 0.469*** 0.325 1.080*** -0.380 
  [2.27] [0.30] [2.71] [0.78] [2.67] [-0.10] 
        
OPENESS  -0.00996*** -0.0214** -0.0105*** -0.0207*** -0.00985 0.00924 
  [-4.00] [-2.21] [-3.88] [-2.73] [-1.57] [0.58] 
        
EXPENDITURE 
ON 
EDUCATION 
0.384*** 0.824*** 0.365*** 0.803*** 0.738*** 1.138*** 
  [3.85] [5.85] [3.65] [6.29] [7.14] [3.06] 
        
FDI INFLOW    0.0583* 0.0889 0.0891 -0.254 
    [1.94] [1.22] [0.88] [-0.30] 
        
CORRUPTION 
OF FIRMS 
    0.0132* 0.0438***
      [1.92] [2.94] 
       
Constant 0.394 -9.667*** 1.068 -7.562* -6.494*** -20.05 
 [0.21] [-3.75] [0.61] [-1.86] [-3.13] [-1.48] 
Observations 401 380 392 371 51 51 
Adjusted R2 0.570  0.505  0.815  
AR(2) 
p-value 
 0.178  0.138  0.143 
Hansen 
p-value 
 0.418  0.639  0.539 
t statistics in brackets; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
   We now turn our focus to the spillover effect of FDI on innovation. It seems that 
the positve spillover effect of FDI exists; however, this effect disappears once we 
include the variable of corporate corruption. Conlumn 5 reveals the fact that the 
higher the percentage of firms that pay informal payment or gift to the public officials 
in a particular counry, the higher is the number of patents applications.  This finding 
is not surprising since resource allocation is often shaped by political connection, and 
firm’s innovation is no exception. Therefore, we conclude that innovation activities in 
the ECA region cannot truly reflect the innovation outcomes because the numbers of 
patents applications is connected to corruption activities. Corruption can adversely 
affect the innovation ability of firms in ECA region. The job of patent exminers is to 
examine whether the claimed innvenion application should be granted the patent. The 
quality of patents applications are adversely affected because the salary of the patent 
examiners are not high in emerging countries. Also, the growth of corruption , 
nepotim, non-transparent practices, and non-accountability of admistractive officers 
who are in power also cause inefficieny of the patent office in assessing and 
approving patent applications. Therefore it is important to establish an effective 
anti-corruption compliance program in order to prevent and detect patents 
applications which are not up to standard. We can conclude that R&D intensity is the 
most important determinat of innovaton actvity, followed by expenditure on 
education.  
For robustness check of findings for the estimates reported in Table 4 using 
random effects method (column 2,4, and 6 in table 4), we adopt Windmeijer (2005) 
general method of moment (SGMM) system panel data estimator, with the two-step 
finite-sample correction, to deal with the handle possible endogenity of the 
independent variables, raised possibly from simultaneity bias, reverse causality and 
omitted variables. In our case the more open is the international trade (openness), it 
may stimulate more domestic innovation in face of intense competition. However the 
reverse causality can happen; whereas more innovations may create more trade 
opportunities. The same may happen for the relationship between corporate 
corruption and innovation. It may be in the direction that more patent applications 
attract more frequent bribery activity. And the use of GMM estimation can overcome 
the endogeneity bias, and control for fixed effects and time effects, and multiple 
endogenous variables. In our paper we use system GMM because the conventional 
dynamic GMM coefficients will be biased for small samples if the series are near unit 
root processes, and the instruments variables are weak.  
In order to check for the consistency of the GMM estimator, we use Hansen test to 
detect overall validity of the instruments, under the null hypothesis that the residuals 
and instrumental variables are not correlated. In our model we also perform a second 
order autocorrelation test for the residuals, to test whether second order serial 
correlation exists in the estimation models. As we can see the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable gives rise to autocorrelation, with correlation of 0.991 between 
patents applications and its first lag. We used the “xtabond2” Stata routine developed 
by Roodman (2005). The explanatory power of the random effects model is quite 
satisfactory, with R2 of 0.815 after taking into the effect of corporate corruption. (See 
column 5, table 4) However, the results for GMM estimates are also provided for 
robustness checking because of the potential endogeneity problem. This study uses a 
two-step estimator, which is asymptotically efficient and robust to any pattern of 
cross-correlation and heteroskedasticity (Roodman, 2006).  Even though there seems 
no prior knowledge regarding exogeneity of regressors we use the number of telphone 
line as the IV. The corrleation coefficient between numbers of telephone lines and 
corruption is -0.573 while the correlation coefficient between numbers of telephone 
lines and patents applications is 0.222.  The result of the SGMM estimation is shown 
in the column 2, 4 and 6 of Table 4.  The validiy if IVs are checked by using 
Autocorrelation AR(2) test, and Hansen test. The instruments used in the model are 
valid as we can see from the results of the above two tests. When we compared the 
results of SGMM (column 6) with the FE results (column 5) we find that expenditure 
on R&D activity and numbers of personnel are not significant for the number of 
patents applications. Interstingly the coefficient and its statistical significance 
increases in the SGMM estimation, and this result futher concide with our argument 
that the numbr of patents applications are not an accuartate indicator of innovation 
activities. Instead higher number of patents applications in emerging economy is 
associated with bribery. Our empirical results regarding the relationship between 
patents applications and corporate corruption is robust for a variety of models. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As the world becomes flat, the interests in entering global markets have surged 
phenomenally. Since markets differ significantly in their business environments, firms 
are cautious in choosing which market to enter and develope FDI and innovation 
activities. In this study, we attempt to provide a deeper understanding of how 
countries differ with respect to their innovations. Specifically, we investigated the 
effects of FDI, corruption and educational expenditure on innovation in emerging 
economies. In previous studies the feature of corporate corruption as an crucial 
informal institution has not been modelled. Therefore, in our study, using World 
Bank’s archival dataset that contains 57 countries, we found that educational 
expenditure, and corporate bribery are positively related to innovations. This finding 
implying FDI in emerging economy, alike China has been overestimeted, simply 
because the features of an informal economy has not been taken into account in the 
regression analysis. The interesting finding of positive effect of bribery on patents 
applications posts caution on the fact that corruption hinders the real innovation 
activities, and hence economic growth and productivity.    
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